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Food consumption involves inherently risky decisions with uncertain probabilities. This 
study examines how second-order ambiguity, or uncertainty over probabilities, affects 
food safety decisions. We conduct a food safety survey wherein subjects face both 
unambiguous and ambiguous situations, each with the same expected value. Respondents 
show a preference for unambiguous situations and state a willingness to pay to avoid 
ambiguity. 
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Every time a person eats, there is a chance he or she may become ill as a result of food-borne 
pathogens such as E. coli, Salmonella, or Trichinella. By definition, eating requires making 
choices that involve risk. In the United States and other industrialized countries, an estimated 
one in four people annually suffer mild to severe symptoms from food-borne pathogens—1 in 
1,000 are hospitalized, and 1 in 60,000 die—imposing a projected annual cost in the billions 
of dollars (Mead et al., 1999). Savage’s (1954) subjective expected utility (SEU) model 
serves as a classic framework for understanding choices under risk given a range of possible 
outcomes with known probabilities, including how people value reductions in risk posed by 
food-borne disease (e.g., Hayes et al., 1995). Under this model, the subjective probabilities 
associated with decision-making outcomes are quantifiable, even while the outcomes of 
decisions are uncertain. The SEU model has also served as the framework for understanding 
how people value reductions in the risks posed by food-borne illness (e.g., Hayes et al., 
1995). 
  Most health risks are ambiguous; food-borne illness is no exception. In theory, ambiguity 
arises when a person is uncertain of (a) the exact probabilities faced in a risky situation, and 
(b) the weight of evidence defining those probabilities (Camerer and Weber, 1992). This 
distinction can be traced as far back as Knight (1921), who characterized uncertainty as 
distinct from risk, because risk may be measurable but uncertainty is inherently unmeasur-
able. Few people are aware of the odds of becoming ill from food-borne pathogens. Most 
individuals have ill-formed and loosely defined beliefs about their chances of getting sick or 
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  The “reduction of compound lotteries” (RCL) axiom assumes that a person is indifferent 
between any two lotteries with the same expected probabilities and payoffs. In the SEU 
model, a person’s choices given unambiguous and ambiguous situations should therefore be 
the same. However, multiple studies have established that people will go out of their way to 
avoid ambiguous risks (e.g., Ellsburg, 1961; Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1989; Curley and 
Yates, 1989; Eisenberger and Weber, 1995). People would rather have the realized outcome 
of their choices depend on events defined by probabilities with which they are confident 
(Siniscalchi, 2008); i.e., they are ambiguity averse. Even if indifference is an option, people 
tend to prefer lotteries with known risk and will pay a price premium to avoid ambiguity 
(Camerer and Weber, 1992; Ahn et al., 2009). Ambiguity avoidance shows that uncertainty 
can bring individuals as much pain as the very risks they are uncertain about (Gilbert, 2009). 
  Many modern economic theories of decision making in the presence of ambiguity focus on 
“multiple probabilities.”
1 The idea is that a person has a “second-order belief” about the risky 
event—a probability measure of probability measures (see Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; 
Siniscalchi, 2008). An individual considering a risky bet constructs a two-stage lottery 
defined by a likelihood of likelihoods. These models focus on preference rankings for second-
order belief bets and reject the classic RCL assumption. We can model the decisions of a 
person who reacts to ambiguity using ambiguous and unambiguous lotteries with equivalent 
expected probabilities if we assume the person does not consider them equivalent (Klibanoff, 
Marinacci, and Mukerji, 2005). A person may reject RCL if, for example, collapsing a two-
stage bet into a one-stage bet is computationally costly (see, e.g., Schelling, 1984; Segal and 
Spivak, 1990). 
  We use this theory of second-order beliefs to frame a person’s choices and valuation given 
ambiguous food safety risks. Using the multiple probability definition of ambiguity, we define 
ambiguity as a range of possible probabilities with the median serving as the unambiguous 
case. We introduce ambiguity by offering conflicting expert estimates of risk incorporated 
using Bayesian updating; this is similar to the approach of Viscusi and Chesson (1999) on 
ambiguous risks of storm damages and Viscusi and Magat (1992) on ambiguous health risks. 
Other researchers have argued that ambiguity aversion cannot be fully captured by second-
order beliefs and preferences regarding ambiguous bets. These researchers contend that 
ambiguity aversion should also reflect preferences over all other acts or noneconomic 
psychological factors such as avoiding negative feelings like regret, blame, or responsibility 
(e.g., Seo, 2009; Yates and Zukowski, 1976; Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1989; Heath and 
Tversky, 1991; Winkler 1991; Dow and Werlang, 1992; Sarin and Winkler, 1992). However, 
if ambiguity-averse people predominantly behave as though second-order beliefs are dominant, 
then this approach remains a useful model, and studying ambiguity with probabilities still can 
be a powerful tool. As Hogarth (1987) notes, “Uncertainty is best communicated through the 
medium of probability theory … [because] the quantitative form is precise and readily inter-
pretable” (p. 191). 
  We consider how ambiguity affects food safety valuation by examining whether or not 
second-order belief ambiguity matters in two contexts. First, we evaluate choices and valua-
tions over a range of very low probability events, reflecting the typical risks to one’s health 
                                                 
1 In an early effort, Becker and Brownson (1964) introduce ambiguity through the length of the range between the highest and 
lowest possible probabilities. Ellsberg (1961) characterizes risk using different colored balls in an urn to reflect different possible 
outcomes. Extending this idea, Hey (1997) notes that the most obvious way to operationalize uncertain probabilities would be a 
randomizing device that pre-selects the color of balls placed in such an urn. It is then natural to consider an urn a second-order 
probability distribution. Kivi and Shogren  Second-Order Ambiguity in Very Low Probability Risks   445 
 
and safety (e.g., 1 in 100,000 to 1 in 10 million). Second, we examine choices and valuations 
framed as a health lottery—in our case, ambiguous probabilities of becoming ill from food-
borne pathogens. We elicit choices and valuations for two scenarios: food safety at a rest-
aurant based on the probabilities calculated in Hayes et al. (1995), and (following Ellsberg, 
1961) monetary urns, which act as a comparative benchmark. Urns are a basic randomizing 
scheme. Think of a winning lottery ball picked from a tumbling urn containing a large 
number of balls. We ask respondents to choose and value very low ambiguous probabilities of 
loss typical of health and environmental contexts (e.g., van Ravenswaay and Wohl, 1995) 
(see the appendix for our survey). Our main finding is that ambiguity is a significant factor 
when making food safety choices. However, a scoping effect exists; i.e., people are insensitive 
to the probability of illness. Most people avoid ambiguous food safety scenarios. Avoidance 
behavior was similar for low (1 in 10) and very low (1 in 10 million) probabilities of loss. In 
addition, while the average person would pay more to avoid ambiguous risks, a bimodal 
response pattern emerged—people bid either $0 or more than the expected loss. This pattern 
of willingness to pay (WTP) varied little, and the ambiguity premium varied modestly as the 
probability of the risky event varied. 
 
Analytical Framework and Hypotheses 
Analytical Framework 
Following Viscusi and Chesson (1999), we employ a state-dependent Bayesian framework to 
capture the decisions made by a person faced with ambiguous food safety risks. We assume 
each individual knows his or her subjective prior beliefs (r0) about probabilities of food 
safety risks and that each person receives two expert opinions (rx and ry) about the proba-
bility of contracting a food-borne illness. In the unambiguous case, the expert opinions are in 
agreement at the benchmark probability, r  (rx = ry =  r ); in the ambiguous case, the expert 
opinions are equal percentages above and below the benchmark probability (,x rr     and 
ry  , r    where ε =0.5 ). r  Given no information about prior beliefs regarding each expert’s 
reliability, we assume equal weighting of expert information to establish an average proba-
bility as a benchmark, r (r  = 0.5rx + 0.5ry). Specifically, the ambiguous lottery is a mean-
preserving spread of the unambiguous case. Given this information, each person estimates a 
subjective probability of contracting a food-borne illness in the unambiguous case (p
u) and in 
the ambiguous case (p
a). 
  The state-dependent expected utility (EU) for unambiguous probabilities is written as: 
(1)    00 (,)( ) 1 (,) ( ) ,
uu u EU prr V YL prrU Y     
and the state-dependent EU for ambiguous probabilities is denoted by: 
(2)    00 ( , ,, ) ( ) 1 ( , ,, ) ( ) ,
aa a EU prr r r r r V YL prr r r r rU Y            
where  0.5 , r   Y represents income, and L represents monetary losses associated with con-
tracting a food-borne illness, which we treat as exogenous. Since food-borne illnesses create 
both morbidity and mortality risks, U is the utility in the state without food-borne illness and 
V is the utility with food-borne illness, such that U(Y) > V(Y) for all Y. Equation (2) allows 
for ambiguity avoidance from many sources, including processing costs. People who find the 446   December 2010  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
range of odds challenging will express a preference for the unambiguous scenario; i.e., they 
will put greater emphasis on the ambiguous threat by heavily weighting the high end of the 
odds range. 
  To determine a person’s ex ante WTP for complete removal of the risk of food-borne illness 
(p
u = 0 and p
a = 0), we estimate that 
(3)    00 () ( , ) ( ) 1 ( , ) ( )
uu u u U YW T P E U prr V YL prrU Y       





() ( , , , ) ( )
1( , , , ) ( )
aa a
a
UY W T P E U p r r r r r rVY L
prrr rr rU Y
      
    
 
in the ambiguous case. If we normalize utility [V(Y − L) = 0 and U(Y) = 1], then equation (3) 
can be rewritten as U(Y − WTP
u) = 1 − p
u(r0, r ) and equation (4) as U(Y − WTP
a) = 1 –  
p
a( 0,, , ) . rrr r r r    
  Each person assigns a weight to each available probability estimate. In the unambiguous 
case,  0
u   represents the weight assigned to subjective prior beliefs r0, and β
u = (1 −  0
u  ) 
represents the weight assigned to the benchmark expert opinion  , r  assuming 0 ≤  0,
u   β
u ≤ 1. 
In the ambiguous case,  0





y   represent the 
weight assigned to each expert’s opinion (rx and ry), and β
a (= 1 − αx − αy − α0) represents 
the weight given to the benchmark probability  . r  Again, we assume 0 ≤  0,,,
aaa
x y   β
a ≤ 1. 
By combining and rearranging terms, the estimated probability of illness for the unambiguous 
case is p
u =  00 ()
u rr r    and for the ambiguous case is p
a =  00 () ( ) .
aa a
xy rr r r        
  Willingness-to-pay in the ambiguous (WTP
a) and the unambiguous case (WTP
u) can differ 
for two reasons. First, they can differ if an individual weights his or her prior beliefs 
differently in the presence of ambiguity; i.e.,  00 .
ua    However, no evidence exists that causes 
us to expect the weight on prior beliefs will differ, since this information is independent of the 
option presented. We therefore assume  00 .
ua    Second, and more likely, WTP differences 
can arise from different weights being placed on expert opinions; i.e.,  .
aa
x y    Assuming 
equally weighted prior beliefs, we can solve
  () ua aa
xy pp r    
 and rewrite WTP
u as 
U(Y − WTP
u) =  0 1( , , , ) a p r rr rr r      + () . aa
xy r     This allows us to directly compare 
the two measures of ex ante WTP, such that the difference in utility is based on the differences 
in weights assigned to the experts, {( ) ( ) }
ua UY W T P UY W T P    = () . aa
xy r     
  If an individual faced with an ambiguous probability weights each expert equally 
[( ) 0], aa
yx     then the probability of illness is identical in both the ambiguous and unambig-
uous cases (p
a = p
u), and his or her WTP will be identical in each case (WTP
a = WTP
u). In 
this case, an ambiguity premium, which we define as the difference between the WTP in each 
case, does not exist: AP = [WTP
a −
 WTP
u] = 0. This implies a person pays more to reduce an 
ambiguous probability if and only if he or she assigns more weight to the negative informa-
tion (0 ) , aa
yx    which leads to p
a > p
u, and thus WTP
a > WTP
u. In general, the literature 
offers support for the notion that people weigh negative information more heavily than 
positive (see Verbeke, Ward, and Viaene, 2000; Fox, Hayes, and Shogren, 2002). 
  A change in benchmark probability () r  affects WTP for unambiguous probability as 




(1 )[ ( ) ( )]
0 and 0.
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If the person attaches some weight to  0 (1 ) ,
u r    the first derivative is positive, since 
U(Y) − V(Y − L) > 0,  0 (1 ) 0,
u    and the marginal utility of wealth (U′) is greater than 
zero. As r  does not appear in the first derivative, the second derivative is zero. Specifically, 






(1 )[ ( ) ( )]
0 and 0.






Equation (6) is positive if the person attaches some weight to  000 [( ) 1].
axy r      If  
2
2 0 and 0 for unambiguous, ambiguous,
jj dWTP d WTP
j
dr dr
   
then WTP increases proportionally with probability level. This is the basis for the risk valua-
tion hypothesis. 
  If modeling ambiguity through second-order uncertainty can generate results consistent 
with the literature on ambiguity avoidance, then second-order risk aversion may be a large 
part of people’s reactions to ambiguity. As a first check of this new model, we designed a 





We test for ambiguity avoidance in two ways. First, we consider three choice hypotheses. 
Given an unambiguous and ambiguous choice and holding expected values constant, the null 
hypothesis for urn choice and food safety choice says there is no difference between the 
number of unambiguous and ambiguous choices. The alternative hypothesis states that the 
unambiguous choice will be more frequent: Ho:  ;
ua
ii CC  Ha:  ,
ua
ii CC   for i = urn and food 
safety, where C
a,u is the number of ambiguous choices (a) or unambiguous choices (u) made. 
The risk choice hypothesis tests whether the percentage of unambiguous choices (%C
u) is 
independent of the probability level (using t-tests): Ho: %C
u1 = %C
u2 = %C
un, for all 
probability levels 1 to n; Ha: %C
um ≠ %C
un, for one or more probability level pairs. Table 1 
summarizes our hypotheses. Table 2 shows the n
 =
 7 probability levels differing by an order 
of magnitude, ranging from 1/10 to 1/10 million. 
  Second, we consider three valuation hypotheses. The  urn valuation and food safety 
valuation hypotheses test whether people will pay more to avoid an ambiguous lottery than an 
unambiguous one with equal expected value. We test these using an ambiguity premium 
(Ho: APi = 0; Ha: APi > 0 for i = urn, food safety). We expect to reject the null hypothesis, 
consistent with previous results (e.g., Camerer and Weber, 1992). The risk valuation hypoth-
esis tests whether WTP and AP increase directly with risk level (the null risk valuation-WTP 
hypothesis is written as: WTP
a1 = WTP
a2 = WTP
an) for all risk levels (1 to n). The 
alternative risk valuation-WTP hypothesis is expressed as: WTP
am > WTP
an, where m > n by
                                                 
2 Hypothetical bias is real and important. We compare scenarios across different risks and ambiguity, holding hypothetical 
imposition constant. The real question is whether the difference across risks and ambiguity would be different under more real-
world circumstances, but this question is beyond the scope of our paper. Responses to hypothetical data can be useful: Balisteri et 
al. (2001) find that while answers obtained from hypothetical dichotomous choice questions significantly exceed actual contribu-
tions, responses to hypothetical open-ended questions do not significantly differ from real-world responses. 448   December 2010  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
Table 1. Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Null  Alternative 
Urn Choice  Ho: C
u = C
a  Ha: C
u > C
a 
Food Safety Choice  Ho: C
u = C
a H a: C
u > C
a 








for one or more probability pairs 
Urn Valuation  Ho: AP = 0  Ha: AP > 0 
Food Safety Valuation  Ho: AP = 0  Ha: AP > 0 








where m > n by an order of magnitude 








where m > n by an order of magnitude 
Notes: Superscript u denotes unambiguous case, superscript a denotes ambiguous case, C represents the number of 
choices,  WTP is willingness to pay to avoid a given risk, AP represents the ambiguity premium (WTP to avoid 
ambiguous risk minus WTP to avoid unambiguous risk), and m and n are risk levels where m > n by an order of 
magnitude. 
 
Table 2. Ambiguous Food Safety Probabilities 
Average Probability if Each 













































an, for all risk levels 1 to n; and the alternative risk valuation-AP hypothesis is given by: 
AP
am > AP




Choices and valuations were elicited for two scenarios: monetary urns and restaurant food 
safety. Given that we wanted to test a broad range of odds, we constructed seven scenarios for 
both urns and food safety by varying the odds by orders of magnitude from 1 in 10 to 1 in 10 
million (see table 2)—several orders of magnitude above and below more typical odds. 
Following standard experimental procedures, we distributed the surveys to 465 students 
enrolled at the University of Wyoming. The survey took less than a half hour to complete.
3 
                                                 
3 The survey instrument is shown in the appendix (the complete set of survey data is available from the authors on request). Kivi and Shogren  Second-Order Ambiguity in Very Low Probability Risks   449 
 
Table 3. Choice Data: Urns by Raw Frequency and by Percentage of Total Responses 
Description 0.1  0.01  0.001  0.0001  0.00001  1/1M 1
 /
 10M Sum 
















































Weak test t-statistic  6.82***  3.99***     7.86***      4.78***  6.74*** 4.27*** 6.74***  15.32***
Strict test t-statistic  0.992       0.766          2.30**      1.50  2.75*** 0.992      2.75*** 4.50***
Note: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  We used open-ended responses for two reasons. First, open-ended responses match up with 
earlier work conducted on food safety (e.g., Ready, Buzby, and Hu, 1996; Hayes et al., 1995) 
and ambiguity (e.g., Eisenberger and Weber, 1995; Fox and Tversky, 1995). Second, Ready, 
Buzby, and Hu (1996) find that open-ended WTP questions for food safety perform better 
than dichotomous choice questions, since respondents in the latter group consistently agree 
with values greater than their actual WTP. Further, as noted by Whitehead (2003), a strength 
of open-ended answers is that they yield a precise point estimate. 
  We adopted Hayes et al.’s (1995) description of mild and severe forms of food-borne 
Salmonella in our food safety scenario. This helped guarantee continuity in valuation 
exercises and provided information about potential consequences of exposure to the pathogen. 
Following Viscusi and Chesson (1999), we presented ambiguity in food safety risks as 
“conflicting expert estimates” (p. 158). Food safety inspectors, each of whom is presumed to 
be an expert, provided differing opinions on the likelihood of contracting a food-borne illness 
when dining at a particular restaurant. To reduce decision costs, we provided the mean odds 
of contraction if each expert opinion is equally believed. According to Mead et al. (1999), 76 
million cases of food-borne illness occur annually as a result of 30 billion total U.S. meals. 
Thus, the actual chance of contracting a food-borne illness is approximately 1 in 400 meals. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Urns 
Due to a small number of responses for each mean risk, we follow Viscusi and Chesson 
(1999) by pooling our responses for all mean risk levels. Both a weak and a strict test are 
considered. If we consider only people who express a distinct preference for either the ambig-
uous or unambiguous probability (weak test), we reject the null of the urn choice hypothesis 
for all probabilities (table 3) using one-tailed t-tests utilizing OLS (for a binomial distribution) 
at the 1% level. However, if we consider all subjects—including those who were indifferent 
to ambiguous and unambiguous probabilities—in a strict test, the results are less definitive. 
The null is rejected for four of seven urn pairs at the 5% level. At 0.1%, 60.3% of people are 
averse to ambiguity for urns, 26.5% are indifferent, and 13.2% prefer ambiguity. 
  The percentage of subjects choosing the unambiguous probabilities did not appear to 
depend on the probability level. We cannot reject the null of the risk choice hypothesis, which 
examines whether WTP differs at different probabilities, for any pair of probabilities for urns 
(see table 4).   450   December 2010  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 

































Urns:           
    Mean  0.861 0.756 0.875 0.780 0.843 0.787 0.843  0.821 
  C.I. Lower Bound  0.754  0.625  0.779  0.662  0.741  0.667  0.741  0.710 
  C.I. Upper Bound  0.967  0.886  0.971  0.898  0.945  0.907  0.945  0.931 
Food Safety:           
    Mean  0.758 0.745 0.900 0.708 0.714 0.745 0.702  0.753 
  C.I. Lower Bound  0.606  0.627  0.804  0.576  0.559  0.623  0.568  0.626 
  C.I. Upper Bound  0.909  0.863  0.996  0.840  0.869  0.868  0.836  0.883 
 
  Similar to Segal and Spivak (1990), we test for ambiguity aversion using ambiguity 
premiums.
4 We test to see if people would pay more to avoid ambiguous risks in two comple-
mentary ways. Following Viscusi and Chesson (1999), we pool data for all seven mean risk 
levels since we also test losses over a large number of probabilities. T-tests to determine if 
ambiguity premiums were different from zero were significant at the 1% level for urns when 
all responses were pooled together (table 5). AP was significantly positive at 1/10 odds (1%), 
1/1,000 (5%), 1/100,000 (5%), 1/1,000,000 (10%), and 1/10,000,000 (5%).
5  
  We also test for ambiguity aversion employing a tobit regression of WTP using dummy 
variables to control for the probabilities [TEN (1/10), HUND (1/100), THOU (1/1,000), 
TENTHOU (1/10K), HUNDTHOU (1/100K), MIL (1/1M)], using 1/10M as the base, and ambi- 
guity (AMBIG), assuming homogeneity of parameters across probabilities (Baltagi, Griffin, 
and Xiong, 2000). AMBIG is significant at the 1% level for urns (table 6). We reject the null 
of the urn valuation hypothesis; on average, people paid more to avoid ambiguous scenarios, 
compared to unambiguous ones with the same expected value. 
  Table 6 also provides evidence for the risk valuation hypothesis, which examines whether 
WTP differs at different probabilities. As reported by Hayes et al. (1995), WTP responses 
changed little for food-borne illnesses, in that WTP decreased by much less than the 
probabilities (p. 854). Our findings are consistent with their results. Responses were relatively 
insensitive to probability level, which ranged from very low (1/10 million) to high (1/10). 
WTP was significantly different compared to the 1 in 10 million scenario only for the 1 in 10 
scenario in urns (5% level). We find evidence of a bimodal response pattern: some people 
paid zero to avoid risks while others paid more than the expected loss. McClelland, Schulze, 
and Coursey (1993) observed a bimodal distribution of valuation responses for insurance when 
the probability was 1/100, with a large number of zero responses, and a spike at a value 
                                                 
4 We also conducted t-tests to see if the unambiguous WTP was different than the ambiguous WTP (results are available from 
the authors upon request). The mean WTP in the ambiguous case was significantly higher (at the 1% level) than the unambiguous 
mean WTP for six of the seven odds for urns, yet only significant for 1 in 10 million odds in food safety (and only at the 10% 
level). 
5 We ran these regressions excluding 97 outliers out of 1,798 possible (5.4% of responses) for several reasons. Data that were 
inconsistent with “obvious logic” were not used (bidding more than $100 to prevent an uncertain loss of $100, 11 of 465 responses 
for the ambiguous urn case, and 9 of 461 responses for the unambiguous case). Also, bids of $9,000 and greater in the food safety 
survey weren’t used since (a) these came primarily from the 1/1 million and 1/10 million cases, whereas the maximum bid for more 
likely odds was $2,000 (seven in each case), and (b) these answers raised doubts about whether respondents considered their ability 
to pay in giving their responses. Including these responses increased the range of the mean data by several orders of magnitude. 
Refusals to play, non-numerical responses, and undefined comparisons were also not used. (Results with outliers are available from 
the authors upon request.) Kivi and Shogren  Second-Order Ambiguity in Very Low Probability Risks   451 
 





 100 1/1K 1/10K 1/100K 1/1M 1
 /
 10M All 













   
 
$28.27** $8.80***
Standard Error  33.11    28.86  35.50  116.23  39.377  25.264  113.97
   68.78   
Z-Value  3.958    0.561  1.700  −0.3808   2.192  1.281  1.984
   2.711   
Sample Size  N = 68    N = 62  N = 63  N = 68  N = 62  N = 63  N = 64
   N = 449   
Note: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 6. Tobit Results: Determinants of Willingness to Pay 






(N = 913)  
Food Safety  
(N = 819)  
































Note: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
 
exceeding the expected value of the loss; many people either overrespond to low probability 
losses or disregard them altogether. Our results also reveal a bimodal pattern. For urns, a 
bimodal pattern emerges for average probabilities from 1/10 down to 1/1,000, with spikes at 
$0 and $10. For 1/10,000 and 1/100,000 probabilities, the bimodal pattern shifts to spikes at 
$0 and $1. For 1 in 1 million odds, the number of zeros dwarfs all other responses. At 1 in 10 
million average probability, however, the bimodal pattern with spikes at $0 and $10 
reemerges. In every case, a cluster of responses emerges lower than the expected loss, and in 
all but the 1/10 case, a cluster emerges that is greater than the expected loss. 
  To test the risk valuation hypothesis for the ambiguity premium, we regress (using tobit) 
AP against probabilities (see table 7).
6 Compared to responses in the 1 in 10 million odds 
scenario, we find evidence that respondents facing more likely scenarios provide different 
                                                 
6 Since some respondents answered a second question for a particular type of lottery (75 people answered urn questions for two 
different levels of odds, and 60 people responded to questions on two different food safety pages), we introduce the dummy 
variable SECOND to see if the responses from a second sheet someone answered differ from the responses given by others. We 
determined that SECOND was not significant. 452   December 2010  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
Table 7. Tobit Results: Determinants of Ambiguity Premium 






(N = 450) 
Food Safety 
(N = 395) 
































Note: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
 
responses. In four of the six odds for urns, the ambiguity premium is significantly larger than 
the AP for the 1 in 10 million scenario. 
 
Food Safety 
If we consider only distinct preferences for either the ambiguous or unambiguous probability 
(weak test), we reject the null of the food safety choice hypothesis for all probabilities (table 
8). In contrast, for the strict test, the null is rejected for just one of seven food safety pairs at 
the 10% level. People who stated a distinct preference clearly preferred the unambiguous 
probability. We cannot infer that all people prefer the unambiguous option, but we can infer 
that the unambiguous choice is preferred by those expressing a choice. The behavior observed 
here is comparable to findings reported by Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) for hypothetical 
insurance purchases. Their subjects revealed 75% ambiguity aversion, 20% indifference, and 
5% ambiguity preference for a 0.1% probability of harm. In comparison, our results show 
53.0% ambiguity-aversion for food safety at 0.1%, 28.6% indifference, and 18.4% ambiguity 
preference. In addition, while other studies found ambiguity aversion for probabilities between 
1% and 50%, we found no such threshold—ambiguity aversion is similar over the entire 
range of probabilities. Between 19% and 29% of our subjects were indifferent to ambiguous 
and unambiguous lotteries at very low probabilities (1/100K to 1/10M). 
  T-tests to determine if ambiguity premiums were different from zero were significant at the 
1% level for food safety when all responses were pooled together (table 9). AP was signifi-
cantly positive at the 1% level for 1/1,000 odds, at the 5% level for 1/10,000 and 1/1,000,000 
odds, and 10% for 1/100,000 and 1/10,000,000 odds. 
  Returning to table 6, we cannot reject the null of the risk choice hypothesis, which 
examines whether WTP differs at different probabilities, for any pair of probabilities for food Kivi and Shogren  Second-Order Ambiguity in Very Low Probability Risks   453 
 
Table 8. Choice Data: Food Safety by Raw Frequency and by Percentage of Total Responses 
Description 0.1  0.01  0.001  0.0001  0.00001  1/1M 1
 /
 10M Sum 
















































Weak test t-statistic  3.45***  4.18*** 8.43***     3.18***  2.81*** 4.02*** 3.03***  9.59***
Strict test t-statistic  0.143       1.060         1.010     0.246      0.143      1.670*      0.124      1.220 
Note: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 9. Ambiguity Premiums by Probability: Food Safety, with t-Test Results 




 100 1/1K 1/10K 1/100K 1/1M 1
 /
 10M All 


















Standard Error  144.22  134.54  15.09    55.43  131.63  36.30  189.12  16.48   
Z-Value  1.1085  0.138  3.320    1.716  1.420  1.690  1.507  2.706   
Sample Size  N = 47  N = 68  N = 58    N = 61  N = 47  N = 60  N = 55  N = 395   
Note: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
safety. In contrast, Viscusi and Chesson (1999) found the degree of ambiguity aversion 
increases as the probability decreases from 95% to 5%. We find no evidence that ambiguity 
aversion differs over our range, 0.1 to 0.0000001, suggesting ambiguity aversion is ubiquitous 
and fairly constant for losses with very low probabilities. 
  We reject the null of the food safety valuation hypothesis. On average, people paid more to 
avoid the ambiguous scenarios, compared to unambiguous ones with the same expected 
value. AMBIG is significant at the 5% level for food safety (table 6). WTP is significantly 
different compared to the 1 in 10 million scenario for the 1 in 10 (1% level), 1 in 10,000 (10% 
level), and 1 in 100,000 (5% level) scenarios in food safety. For food safety, a bimodal pattern 
with spikes at $0 and $10 emerges for all scenarios, except the 1 in 10 average odds. In that 
case, people respond with a variety of nonzero responses, consistent with findings reported by 
McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey (1993) for probabilities of 1/5 or greater. Our responses 
corroborate previous results that show some people overvalue low probability losses (Smith 
and Desvousges, 1987), while others value such losses at essentially zero (Kunreuther et al., 
1978). Our results support the bimodal response to very low probability risks. Insensitivity to 
scope for WTP exists in ambiguous/very low probability situations, which may indicate 
inconsistency with a rational choice model. However, the large number of $0 responses may 
also suggest there exists a threshold below which risks are viewed as not worth worrying 
about, consistent with the sort of very low probability risks commonplace in everyday life, 
such as the risk of driving to work. These $0 responses may represent a type of bounded 
rationality, if the expected marginal utility changes involved in moving from, say, a risk of 1 
in 10,000,000 to a 1 in 1,000,000 risk, are not large enough to warrant the cognitive costs of 
estimating them.   454   December 2010  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
  Compared to responses in the 1 in 10 million odds scenario, we find weak evidence that 
respondents facing more likely scenarios provide different responses. Only in the 1 in 100 
scenario does the AP differ for food safety, with 5% significance (table 7). This may be due 
to the larger standard errors in the food safety case; however, this result may also indicate that 
ambiguity is less important with respect to health (Goldberg, Roosen, and Nayga, 2006). 
 
Conclusions 
We find that people prefer unambiguous food safety choices over ambiguous ones with the 
same expected value, consistent with previous studies. Hogarth and Kunreuther (1989), for 
instance, found consumers’ pricing decisions for insurance were sensitive to ambiguity. Ambi- 
guity premiums—how much more people are willing to pay to avoid an ambiguous situation 
than an equivalent unambiguous one—are positive for both food safety and urn scenarios, 
indicating people are, on average, ambiguity averse for these very low probability risks. Our 
results also suggest that expenditures to improve people’s knowledge of food-borne risks 
could be worth undertaking even if no corresponding decrease in the level of illnesses 
contracted occurs. Private and public information policies designed to reduce ambiguity can 
increase the utility of ambiguity-averse people. An interesting extension of this study would 
be a comparison of second-order uncertainty to extreme ambiguity (ignorance of probabili-
ties) in order to determine how much more ambiguity aversion (if any) people would exhibit. 
  We note three caveats to consider following this study. First, it is likely that subjects’ prior 
perceptions of risk affected the food safety results more than the urn results, especially if they 
could not separate food-borne illness from other common ailments (e.g., the flu). These 
heterogeneous and unobserved prior beliefs likely explain some variation in risk valuation. 
Second, our subject pool used students, who might have less risk-averse behavior than, say, 
middle-aged adults with young children. Further research expanding an ambiguity survey to a 
more representative population would be worthwhile. Third, we use an open-ended valuation 
question, the pros and cons of which have been debated in the valuation literature (e.g., 
incentive incompatibility, zero values), and we have eliminated several responses appearing 
to be outliers. Future experiments involving real money should be used to replicate these 
results while addressing these caveats. 
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Appendix: Survey Scenarios 
Monetary Urn Scenario 
Imagine two large urns, each containing 100 balls. Urn A contains 100 balls numbered 1 to 100, with each 
number represented by exactly one ball. If the number 67 is drawn from the urn, you lose $100; otherwise, 
you lose nothing. Urn B also contains 100 balls, but each ball is randomly selected over the range of 1 to 
100. In other words, it is possible for any number of balls to have the number 67 on it, including zero of 
them. Note that each of the 100 balls has a 1 in 100 chance of showing 67. Again, if the number 67 is drawn 
from this urn, you lose $100; otherwise, you lose nothing. 
[1]  In dollars and cents, how much would you be willing to pay to avoid playing lottery A?  
[2]  In dollars and cents, how much would you be willing to pay to avoid playing lottery B? 
[3] Would  you  rather  avoid lottery A, lottery B, or are you indifferent between them? 
 
Food Safety Scenario 
The following description of Salmonella will be useful to you in answering questions: 
■  Mild: 1–2 days of abdominal discomfort, possible nausea and diarrhea; similar to a mild case of the flu. 
■ Severe: 1–3 weeks of acute abdominal pains, vomiting, diarrhea; usually requires hospitalization; 1 in 
1,000 people who get Salmonella die. 
Imagine you would like to go out to eat at a restaurant. You have information regarding the food safety 
practices in various restaurants. In your town there are two restaurants of similar quality. There are also two 
local food safety inspectors. 
■ At Restaurant A, both food safety inspectors agree there is a 1 in 100 (1%) chance of contracting 
Salmonella, per meal. 
■ At Restaurant B, however, the inspectors disagree on the per meal odds of contracting Salmonella, with 
one inspector placing the odds at 1 in 67 (1.5%), and the other placing them at 1 in 200 (0.5%), averaging 
1.0%, or 1 in 100). 
[1] How much would you be willing to pay to eliminate the chance of Salmonella contraction at restaurant A? 
[2] How much would you be willing to pay to eliminate the chance of Salmonella contraction at restaurant B? 
[3] If these two restaurants were your only choices for a meal this evening, and their prices were identical, 
would you rather eat at restaurant A, restaurant B, or are you indifferent between them? 